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Most judges display an exemplary demeanor in their courtrooms, behaving 
with courtesy and civility on the bench.1  However, some judges exhibit anger 
                                                      
 + Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law; J.D., University of Texas School of Law, 1990; 
B.A., Brandeis University, 1987.  I gratefully acknowledge the help of Professor and Dean Emeritus 
James J. Alfini for his insights into issues regarding judicial discipline and thank the Executive 
Directors of Judicial Conduct Commissions who allowed me to interview them for this Article.  
Thanks also to former Los Angeles Superior Court Judge David Rothman for his ideas about 
judicial discipline.  I also appreciate my two wonderful research assistants, Kelsey Lieper and 
Amanda Bosley, for their dedication and persistence in researching these issues.  Last, but not least, 
thanks to the editors of the Catholic University Law Review for their thoughtful edits on the piece. 
 1. Most state bar associations conduct judicial preference polls that reflect overall 
satisfaction with judicial demeanor.  For example, a recent survey by the Houston Bar Association 
asked whether certain trial judges are “courteous and attentive toward attorneys and witnesses[.]”  
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and hostility toward those who appear before them in their courtrooms.2  The 
public has become increasingly dissatisfied by judges’ behavior that does not 
match their obligation to behave with courtesy and civility on the bench.3  As 
commentators begin to wrestle with the issue of angry judges,4 the public and 
the legal community are calling for greater transparency within the system of 
judicial discipline, hoping to stem the tide of judicial misbehavior.5  Displays of 
judicial anger toward those in courtrooms appear to be on the rise, though this 
perception could certainly be skewed due to the ubiquity of the press and social 
media.6 
                                                      
HOUSTON BAR ASS’N, HOUSTON BAR ASSOCIATION JUDICIAL EVALUATION RESULTS (2013), 
available at http://www.hba.org/folder-poll-results/2011HBA_evaluation.pdf. Overall, the results 
reflect satisfaction with the demeanor of trial judges.  See id. 
 2. Terry A. Maroney, Angry Judges, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1208 (2012).  See generally 
Annotation, Disciplinary Action Against Judge on Ground of Abusive or Intemperate Language or 
Conduct Toward Attorneys, Court Personnel, or Parties to or Witnesses in Actions, and the Like, 
89 A.L.R. 4th 278 (1991) (providing a comprehensive list of cases, in which judges exhibited angry 
and abusive behavior). 
 3. See KEVIN BURKE & STEVE LEBEN, AMERICAN JUDGES ASS’N, PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS: 
A KEY INGREDIENT IN PUBLIC SATISFACTION 6–8 (2007) (noting that citizens expect to be treated 
respectfully when appearing before a judge).  Some perceive judges as celebrities because of how 
much attention the public devotes to them.  See Pierce J. Reed, Lady Justice: U.S. Magistrate Judge 
Joyce London Alexander, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 901, 902 (2003-2004) (noting that “[f]or better or 
worse, [judges] are starring players in the pageantry of modern media.  They serve as saviors and 
sinners; they may be heroic or hated, revered or reviled.”).  The American Bar Association (ABA)’s 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to be “patient, dignified, and courteous” to those 
who appear before them.  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.8(B) (2007).  Most states 
include some version of this rule in their rules of judicial conduct. 
 4. See e.g., Steven Lubet, Bullying from the Bench, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 11, 12 (2001); 
Maroney, supra note 2, at 1208.  See also Douglas R. Richmond, Bullies on the Bench, 72 LA. L. 
REV. 325, 330 (2012). 
 5. See William Glaberson, A Push to Open Judge-Misconduct Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 
2011, at A19.  See also Eric Dexheimer, Who’s Policing Texas Judges?, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, 
Apr. 15, 2012, at A1 (noting that the Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct’s judicial disciplinary 
records are confidential); Brian Rogers, Defense Lawyers Complain Judges Rarely Punished, 
HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 4, 2012, at B1 (noting “[t]hat lack of transparency, about complaints and 
results, is what frustrates those who want to see judges punished.  It also runs counter to the public 
nature of courtrooms, where most information is supposed to be public”). 
 6. Almost monthly, the press contains examples of judges displaying anger in their 
courtrooms.  To illustrate, in August 2012, the Daily Mail reported on a hearing, discussed later in 
this Article, in which a judge screamed at a pastor.  Laura Pullman, “Watch moment judge screams 
at pastor during divorce hearing because he blames him for negative publicity (oh, the irony),” 
MAIL ONLINE (Aug. 11, 2012, 9:44 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2186994/ 
Judge-William-Wakins-Judge-screams-pastor-divorce-hearing-blames-bad-publicity.html.  This 
was also reported by the Huffington Post, see David Lohr, Arthur Hage Yelled At By Judge William 
Watkins, Says ‘It’s Not Over’, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 10, 2012, 2:53 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/10/arthur-hage-william-watkins_n_1764984.html, and 
the West Virginia Gazette, see Kate White, Online video latest in Putnam judge-pastor feud, W. 
VA. GAZETTE (June 27, 2012), http://www.wvgazette.com/News/201206270260. In October 2012, 
the Houston Chronicle reported on a similar incident in which a judge yelled at a pregnant woman.  
Harvey Rice, Galveston judge accused of screaming at pregnant woman in court, HOUS. CHRON. 
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This Article addresses the intersection between judicial anger and attempts by 
judicial sanctioning tribunals to correct the behavior with public sanctions.  
Disciplinary tribunals tend to impose public sanctions as harsh discipline for a 
judge’s egregiously hostile behavior or repeated displays of anger.7  This Article 
challenges the notion that public discipline motivates a judge’s positive 
behavioral changes.  For some judges, particularly those whose wrongdoing 
involves anger, this approach is counterproductive, as shame from the publicity 
of wrongdoing can stigmatize the judge, exacerbating her anger, hostility, and 
sense of isolation.8  Organizations involved in regulating judicial behavior9 and 
legislatures involved in making laws regarding the authority of these 
organizations should work toward a more deliberate philosophy of judicial 
corrections. 
Adopting such a philosophy will ensure that the consequences flowing from 
judicial discipline are the intended ones.10  Commentators provide a rich arsenal 
of valuable research and insights to guide legislators and judges, particularly 
with regard to shaming penalties.11  However, legal academia has yet to address 
the vices and virtues of shaming in the specific context of judicial discipline; 
literature concerning the effectiveness of public discipline by judicial 
                                                      
(Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.chron.com/communityblogs/atmosphere/article/tba-3981139.php.  On 
November 8, 2012, the ABA Journal reported on an Illinois judge who won reelection despite 
previously being barred from the courthouse for shoving a sheriff’s deputy.  See Debra Cassens 
Weiss, Judge Barred from Courthouse Wins Re-Election, Presses Insanity Defense in Battery Case, 
AM. BAR ASS’N J. (Nov. 8, 2012, 9:53 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judge_ 
barred_from_courthouse_wins_re-election_presses_insanity_defense_in_b/. 
 7. If the behavior is particularly egregious and the public sanction (sometimes imposed more 
than once) did not suffice, the tribunals typically impose a suspension in conjunction with a public 
reprimand of the judge as a more effective method of discipline.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary 
Proceeding Against Eiler, 236 P.3d 873, 882–83 (Wash. 2010) (demonstrating that the Supreme 
Court of Washington suspended a judge for five days without pay after noting that the judge had 
already been censured once by the Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct). 
 8. See infra note 11. 
 9. Judicial conduct commissions, state bar associations, and educational organizations such 
as the National Judicial College should work together towards improving judicial education and 
discipline to better protect the public from outbursts by angry judges. 
 10. In the criminal law arena, commentators have similarly reflected on consequences flowing 
from criminal punishment.  See Amanda D. Cary, Comment: Cocaine Base: Not All It’s Cracked 
Up to Be, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 554 (2006) (discussing the utilitarianism and retributivism 
theories of punishment).  See also Brian Forst, Managing Miscarriages of Justice from 
Victimization to Reintegration, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1209, 1262 (2010-2011) (analyzing the impact of 
sentencing policy in past decades); Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking 
Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (2001) (noting that 
“during the past several decades, the justice system’s focus has shifted from punishing past crimes 
to preventing future violations through the incarceration and control of dangerous offenders”). 
 11. See infra Part II.B.  Although disciplinary tribunals do not refer to public sanctions 
imposed on judges as shaming penalties, publicizing a judge’s name and wrongdoing is meant to 
express the tribunal’s disapproval of the judge’s conduct and thus it should come as no surprise that 
stigma is likely to flow from the discipline. 
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sanctioning tribunals at modifying this type of judicial behavior is sparse.12  This 
Article is the first to tackle whether disciplining an angry judge with public 
sanctions—sanctions likely to shame the judge—are effective at modifying the 
judge’s behavior and thereby protecting the public. 
The Article broaches this topic in the context of the “social media effect,”13 a 
recent phenomenon that should inform judicial discipline.  This phenomenon is 
changing the landscape of judicial discipline by altering the consequences a 
judge suffers as a result of her misbehavior.  The Article demonstrates that the 
consequences a judge experiences because her wrongdoing is broadcast via 
social media can be minimal or substantial, ranging from mildly disparaging 
tweets to death threats.14  This effect is impacting the course of traditional 
judicial discipline because the public strives to participate, at times pressuring 
sanctioning bodies to take action against an angry judge.15 
Part I of the Article illustrates the reality facing some litigants and lawyers in 
courtrooms: angry judges.  Relying on social science research involving 
shaming as discipline and the effect of social media, Part II of the Article 
suggests that shaming an already angry judge in a public manner that stigmatizes 
the judge is likely to lead the judge to resist the sanctioning tribunal and become 
increasingly hostile.  Part III of the Article describes the social media effect, 
explaining that displays of judicial anger are often publicized, regardless of 
formal disciplinary proceedings.16 
                                                      
 12. In a recent article, Jonathan Abel provides empirical evidence to evaluate three commonly 
held beliefs about the aggressiveness with which different judicial conduct commissions impose 
discipline on judges.  See Jonathan Abel, Note, Testing Three Commonsense Intuitions About 
Judicial Conduct Commissions, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1048–49 (2012).  The data Abel collected 
shows substantial disparities among jurisdictions in terms of their aggressiveness in sanctioning 
judges.  Id. at 1055–56.  Although Abel’s article provides much needed insight and empirical 
evidence regarding the inconsistencies among sanctioning commissions, nowhere in the existing 
literature do academics tackle the basic question of whether the type of discipline currently imposed 
on judges is effective at protecting the public. 
 13. See Zahera Harb, Arab Revolutions and the Social Media Effect, M/C J., 
http://journal.media-culture.org.au/index/php/mcjournal/article/view/364 (last visited Mar. 26, 
2014) (coining the term “social media effect” and describing the phenomenon’s effect on Middle 
Eastern politics).  In this Article, the term refers to the impact social media has on judges by 
publicizing their misbehavior, giving the public an opportunity to respond, and, at times, impacting 
the disciplinary process. 
 14. See infra Part III (describing several instances of strong public reaction to wrongdoing by 
judges). 
 15. See infra note 157 and accompanying text (describing a situation in which the public 
pressured a judicial conduct commission to take action regarding a judge’s purported misbehavior; 
the public’s response was so overwhelming that the commission had to require that no further 
complaints be filed). 
 16. Social media provides the public easy access to information concerning angry judges, and 
the public is often eager to “weigh in” by commenting on judicial misbehavior.  Stories of judges 
displaying “unjudgelike” behavior routinely appear in newspapers, see supra note 6 and 
accompanying text, and bar journals, see, e.g., Martha Neil, See the Video: Angry Judge Blasts 
‘Backseat Driver’ Appellate Counsel in High-Profile Murder Case, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (Oct. 9., 
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Part IV of the Article recommends innovative forms of discipline, including 
methods of keeping the process of judicial discipline outside the traditional 
disciplinary system.  This section recommends education and mentoring on the 
subject of preventing or constraining anger as well as early intervention in the 
form of peer-to-peer counseling and reconciliation meetings to use reintegrative 
shame, rather than stigmatizing shame, to motivate angry judges’ improved 
behavior. 
Procedural fairness17 and restorative justice18 shape this discussion.  In the 
criminal law context, these approaches suggest that as sanctions become more 
punitive and stigmatizing, they become less effective because individuals 
become less inclined to follow authority.19  On the other hand, individuals 
become self-regulating when they respect authority and rules as legitimate.20  
This Article suggests that, along the same lines, judicial sanctioning bodies 
should impose discipline that encourages judges to self-regulate, rather than 
using corrective methods that stigmatize. 
                                                      
2012, 1:37 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/jefferson_circuit_kentucy_judge_ 
martin_mcdonald_backseat_driver_video/; Weiss, supra note 6.  YouTube, Troy from West 
Virginia, Putnam County, WV, Family Law Judge, William Watkins, May 23, 2012 
MELTDOWN!!!!!, YOUTUBE (June 26, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=APD4a347bPQ 
[hereinafter Judge Watkins YOUTUBE Video], and websites devoted to publicizing information 
about judges, see ABOVE THE LAW, http://abovethelaw.com (last visited May 9, 2014); CITIZENS 
FOR JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, http://www.judicialaccountaibility.net (last visited May 9, 2014); 
CITIZENS FOR LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY, http://www.clr.org (last visited May 9, 2014); ROBEPROBE, 
http://www.robeprobel.com (last visited May 9, 2014); VERY BAD JUDGES, http://verybad 
judges.blogspot.com (last visited May 9, 2014), provide ample coverage of judges displaying 
hostility in their courtrooms, and also allow the public to react to the judicial behavior. 
 17. Procedural fairness suggests that “process matters” because “people’s evaluations of the 
resolution of a dispute (including matters resolved by the judicial system) are influenced more by 
their perception of the fairness of the process employed than by their belief regarding whether the 
‘right’ outcome was reached.”  Thomas L. Hafemeister, Sharon G. Garner & Veronica E. Bath, 
Forging Links and Renewing Ties: Applying the Principles of Restorative and Procedural Justice 
to Better Respond to Criminal Offenders with a Mental Disorder, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 147, 200 (2012).  
See also Jordan M. Singer, The Mind of the Judicial Voter, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1443, 1456–58 
(2011) (highlighting the importance of fair judicial procedures). 
 18. Restorative justice is an approach to resolving disputes that emphasizes “1) deliberation 
and decision making by a diverse group of stakeholders [in the dispute] and 2) discussion that 
focuses on repairing the damage caused by the offender.” Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. 
Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of Restorative Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 253, 255 (2012).  
It typically takes the form of victim/offender mediations, conferencing among stakeholders, and 
sentencing circles.  Id.  Restorative justice is also described as “a process that brings victims and 
offenders together to face each other, to inform each other about their crimes and victimization, to 
learn about each others’ backgrounds, and to collectively reach agreement on a ‘penalty’ or 
‘restorative justice sanction.’”  Meghan Condon, Note, Bruise of a Different Color: The 
Possibilities of Restorative Justice for Minority Victims of Domestic Violence, 17 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 487, 495 (2010). 
 19. See Tom R. Tyler, Restorative Justice and Procedural Justice: Dealing with Rule 
Breaking, 62 J. SOC. ISSUES 307, 308 (2006) (explaining that hostility can result from punitive 
policies). 
 20. Id. at 308–09. 
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I.  ANGRY JUDGES 
What is it about judges and anger?  Countless examples exist of judges losing 
their tempers and lashing out at parties, lawyers, and personnel in their 
courtrooms.21   Sometimes, litigants or lawyers appear to provoke judicial 
anger;22 in other instances, a difficult or emotional case gives rise to a judicial 
outburst.23  Occasionally, judges seem to fly off the handle with no apparent 
provocation.24 
YouTube provides several examples of judges expressing anger in court.  
West Virginia’s Putnam Circuit Judge William Watkins was videotaped 
screaming at pastor Arthur Hage in court during Hage’s divorce proceedings in 
2012.25  In the video, which was posted on YouTube on June 26, 2012 and has 
since received over 250,000 hits, the judge chastises Hage for speaking to a 
reporter who wrote an article posted on PutnamLive.com, which apparently 
showed a picture of the judge’s home.26  The judge claimed his property was 
vandalized several times as a result of the photo.27  Judge Watkins started the 
hearing as follows: “Mr. Hage, if you say one word out of turn, you’re going to 
jail.  Do you understand me? . . .  Shut up!  Don’t even speak . . . .  You disgusting 
piece of [inaudible].”28  He screamed at Hage during most of their exchange. 
Judge Watkins later recused himself from any other proceedings in Hage’s case, 
admitting he lost his temper.29 
Hage filed several complaints against Watkins with the Judicial Investigation 
Commission of West Virginia.30  Soon after the hearing, the West Virginia 
                                                      
 21. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 22. Richmond, supra note 4, at 328–29 (“Even judges who enjoy impressive self-control and 
gracious bearings may sometimes lose patience with incompetent or uncivil lawyers, or especially 
difficult or disruptive litigants.”). 
 23. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.  See also infra notes 26–28 (describing a 
judge’s outburst against a party the judge thought had engaged in inappropriate out of court conduct 
against the judge and the judge’s family). 
 24. See, e.g., John Council, Jones Says Dennis Accepted Her Apology After Heated “Shut 
Up” Exchange, TEX. LAWYER (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.texaslawyer.com/id=1202516573154 
(describing an en banc oral argument in which Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Edith Jones 
interrupted her colleague’s questioning and told him to “shut up”). 
 25. See Judge Watkins YOUTUBE Video, supra note 16.  After Watkins granted the divorce 
petition filed by Hage’s wife, Hage sued the judge for $5 million.  White, supra note 6.  He has 
also appealed the divorce to West Virginia’s Supreme Court.  Id.  Judge Watkins brings his dog, 
Buddy, to chambers to ease tension in the courtroom.  Cheryl Caswell, Family law judge’s pooch 
provides a soothing presence, W. VA. GAZETTE (Nov. 16, 2011), http://charlestondailymail.com/ 
News/PutnamCounty/201111150258. 
 26. Judge Watkins YOUTUBE Video, supra note 16. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Martha Neil, State Supreme Court Administrator Won’t Pile another Complaint on Judge 
in YouTube Video, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (July 3, 2012, 11:49 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/ 
article/state_supreme_court_administrator_wont_pile_another_complaint_on_judge_in_y/. 
 30. Id. 
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Supreme Court announced that it decided not to look into the incident after Judge 
Watkins admitted to overreacting and recused himself.31  However, in August 
2012 an unrelated West Virginia Supreme Court action charged that Judge 
Watkins failed to enter orders into the state’s tracking system.32  In September 
2012, the Judicial Investigation Commission filed five additional charges 
against Judge Watkins involving allegations of shouting at litigants and using 
profanity in court.33  Judge Watkins was apparently outraged by the allegations, 
blaming the alleged backlog on his caseload.34   Judge Watkins claimed the 
number of divorce proceedings he oversaw was “the highest in West Virginia.”35  
Even before the incident with Hage, Judge Watkins had begun taking his dog 
Buddy to court with him each day to ease stress.36 
Another example of a judge caught on tape yelling at lawyers or parties in a 
courtroom is retired Kentucky Circuit Judge Martin McDonald.37  On the tape, 
Judge McDonald can be heard admonishing an appellate lawyer during a hearing 
for a new trial in a death penalty case.38  Judge McDonald told the lawyer that if 
the lawyer ever called him on his cellphone again, Judge McDonald would 
“strangle” him.39  When the lawyer tried to explain that the court system 
provided the phone number and opposing counsel was aware he was making the 
call, the judge repeatedly cut him off, calling him unethical and a “backseat 
driver,” and further threatened to have the lawyer disbarred.40 
According to some, judges and anger go hand in hand.41  Judging is stressful, 
and some parties and lawyers certainly push judges’ buttons.42  Judges preside 
over litigants who are disputatious; the environment is adversarial and often the 
judge adopts the stress.43  Furthermore, judges vary in terms of their ability to 
regulate their emotions.44  In addition, the legal system arguably encourages 
                                                      
 31. Lohr, supra note 6. 
 32. Martha Neil, Angry Judge in YouTube Video Calls Unrelated Ethics Case re 
‘Overwhelming’ Caseload ‘Infuriating’, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (Aug. 13, 2012, 10:37 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/angry_judge_in_youtube_video_calls_unrelated_ethics_
case_re_overwhelmi1/. 
 33. Kate White, Supreme Court votes not to suspend Putnam family judge, W. VA. GAZETTE 
(Sept. 7, 2012), http://wvgazette.com/News/201209070064. 
 34. See Neil, supra note 32. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Caswell, supra note 25. 
 37. Neil, supra note 16. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Andrew Wolfson, Judge threatens to ‘strangle’ attorney in “ridiculous” case, THE 
COURIER-JOURNAL (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.courier-journal.com/comments/article/20121003/ 
NEWS01/310030101/judge-threatens-strangle-attorney-ridiculous-case; Neil, supra note 16. 
 40. Neil, supra note 16. 
 41. See Maroney, supra note 2, at 1208; Richmond, supra note 4, at 328–39. 
 42. See Maroney, supra note 2, at 1232, 1238. 
 43. See id. at 1238–44 (describing behavior by litigants that causes judicial anger). 
 44. Id. at 1227–28. 
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judges to abuse their authority by putting them on thrones and requiring that they 
wear special robes to demonstrate power.45 
Case law,46 newspapers,47 magazine articles,48 orders of sanctioning 
commissions,49 and the Internet50 are rife with examples of angry judges.  In 
October 2012, the Houston Chronicle reported that Galveston County District 
Judge Lonnie Cox yelled and cursed at a pregnant defendant appearing in his 
court on a drug related charge, screaming at the woman: “This is s—-.  This kind 
of b———- is not what the drug court should be doing and is costing the 
taxpayers money.”51  Judge Cox called the defendant “worthless” and tore up 
paperwork concerning her plea arrangement before storming out of the 
courtroom.52  The defendant’s attorney told the Houston Chronicle that he 
planned to file a complaint about Judge Cox’s behavior with the Texas 
Commission on Judicial Conduct.53 
Litigants frequently file motions for recusal in response to displays of judicial 
anger.54  Sometimes, courts will transfer cases to a different judge on remand or 
grant a new trial because of the original trial judge’s anger.55  Additionally, 
                                                      
 45. See Norman L. Greene, A Perspective on “Temper in the Court: A Forum on Judicial 
Civility”, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 709, 715 (1996) (citing Mark A. Neubauer, Things You Have 
Wanted To Tell a Judge (But Didn’t Dare), 21 LITIG. 17, 17 (1994)). 
 46. See, e.g., In re Ellender, 16 So. 3d 351, 352–53 (La. 2009) (describing a judge’s 
demeaning behavior towards a party during a show cause hearing); In re Fuller, 798 N.W.2d 408, 
413 (S.D. 2011) (discussing a judge who regularly used profanity in front of staff and attorneys); 
In re Hammermaster, 985 P.2d 924, 927 (Wash. 1999) (en banc) (describing several allegations of 
misconduct against a judge, including abusing authority and raising an appearance of impropriety). 
 47. See, e.g., White, supra note 25; Wolfson, supra note 37. 
 48. See, e.g., Adam Cohen, A Real-Life Judge Judy Gets Smacked Down, TIME (Aug. 18, 
2010), www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,2011494,00.html. 
 49. See, e.g., In re Steensland, No. 39, 2011 WL 9367406, at *1 (Ala. Jud. Inquiry Comm’n 
May 2. 2011), available at http://judicial.alabama.gov/judiciary/COJ39FINALJUDG.pdf; In re 
Grant, CJC No. 4952-F-131, 2006 WL 6084806, at *1, *2 (Wash. Comm’n Jud. Conduct Aug. 4, 
2006), available at http://www.cjc.state.wa.us/Case%20Material/2006/4952%20Grant% 
20Stipulation.pdf; Public Admonition: Honorable W. Jeanne Meurer, ST. TEX. COMMISSION JUD. 
CONDUCT 3 (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/pdf/actions/FY2010-PUBSANC.pdf 
[hereinafter Public Admonition]. 
 50. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
 51. Rice, supra note 6. 
 52. Id.  According to the article, the description of the event largely comes from the recusal 
motion filed by the defendant’s attorney.  Id.  Judge Cox refused to recuse himself from the case 
and referred the recusal decision to the presiding judge of the Montgomery County District Court.  
Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See, e.g., State v. Hasan, No. A-4395-07T4, 2009 WL 2475304, at *15–20 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. Aug. 14, 2009) (affirming a lower judge’s denial of the defendant’s motion requesting 
that the judge recuse himself for comments he made during a pretrial conference). 
 55. See, e.g., In re United States, 614 F.3d 661, 662, 665–66 (7th Cir. 2010) (denying 
rehearing of an order directing the district court to admit certain exhibits into evidence and reassign 
the case to a different judge, explaining that the district court judge displayed “a degree of anger 
and hostility toward the government that is in excess of any provocation that we can find in the 
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disciplinary tribunals, including both judicial conduct commissions and 
reviewing courts, frequently sanction judges whose anger crosses the line, as all 
judges are required to act in a “patient, dignified, and courteous” manner towards 
all of the persons with whom the judge interacts in an official capacity.56 
Judges accused of angry outbursts often defend their behavior on grounds of 
judicial independence, which presumably permits a judge to adopt whatever 
style leads to effective results.57  A good deal of firm, no-nonsense judicial 
behavior is defensible on these grounds.58  As Justice Scalia explained in Liteky 
v. United States,59 federal judges are not immune from feelings of anger, 
annoyance, and impatience.60  In fact, justified and well-regulated judicial anger 
can be a productive force that “does not detract unduly from the work at hand, 
nor does its expression unduly disrupt either the mechanisms or image of 
justice.”61 
Meanwhile, striking the correct balance between disciplining improper 
behavior and permitting judges to choose an effective style is critical.  The public 
appears to abhor judges who scream at parties in court.62  Furthermore, litigants’ 
perception of judicial fairness is generally based in large part on the judge’s 
temperament.63  In an article concerning the rise of public criticism against the 
judiciary, one commentator posits that “the simplest reform judges could take to 
increase confidence in the courts would be to refrain from abusing, denigrating, 
                                                      
record.”); Santa Maria v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 81 F.3d 265, 273–74 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(vacating the judgment and ordering a new trial before a different judge when the original judge 
“displayed an antipathy to Santa Maria’s claim that went beyond judicial skepticism,”  
cross-examined plaintiff’s expert witnesses sarcastically, and generally behaved unfairly towards 
the plaintiff’s original counsel). 
 56. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.8(B) (2011).  Most states have adopted some 
version of this rule of conduct. 
 57. See, e.g., Public Admonition, supra note 49.  Judge Jeanne Meurer ordered her bailiff to 
lock all of the participants of a juvenile detention hearing (including the juvenile’s mother) in a 
holding cell so they could experience the feeling of being “locked up.”  Id.  Judge Meurer defended 
her conduct before the State Commission on Judicial Conduct by admitting that she got angry, but 
arguing that her actions were valid because they were “‘within her authority’” and she was 
attempting to achieve a settlement in the matter.  Id.  The Commission disagreed and publicly 
admonished Judge Meurer.  Id. 
 58. See In re Hocking, 546 N.W.2d 234, 240–41 (Mich. 1996) (explaining that not every 
tasteless comment or angry outburst is considered judicial misconduct). 
 59. 510 U.S. 540 (1994). 
 60. Id. at 555–56.  See also People v. Stewart, No. 287286, 2010 WL 1687756, at *2 (Mich. 
Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2010) (refusing to disqualify a judge for acting impatient and exasperated during 
a trial). 
 61. Maroney, supra note 2, at 1261.  Maroney claims that judicial anger can actually have 
behavioral benefits, such as facilitating judgment and motivating responsive action.  Id. at  
1261–62. 
 62. See infra Part III (discussing several examples of the public’s strong reaction to displays 
of anger by judges). 
 63. Sambhav N. Sankar, Comment, Disciplining the Professional Judge, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 
1233, 1241–42 (2000). 
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and insulting people in their writings and speech.”64  Judicial discourtesy reflects 
poorly not only on the individual judge, but also on the entire judiciary.65 
Research reflects that people judge procedural fairness on the basis of how 
police and judges treat them, not necessarily on the outcome of a particular 
experience.66  According to this “procedural justice” scholarship, the public’s 
primary concerns about the police and courts involve whether they treat citizens 
with dignity and respect and recognize the public’s rights and concerns.67  
Therefore, “intemperate conduct by judges” leads the public to doubt the fairness 
of the judge’s decision, “breed[ing] a lack of respect for . . . the judicial system 
itself.”68 
A judge yelling “shut up” at someone in her courtroom appears to be a 
common expression of judicial anger.69  In fact, during an en banc oral argument 
in 2011, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Edith Jones told her colleague, 
Judge Dennis, to “shut up” as he questioned the government’s lawyer.70  Judge 
Jones interrupted Judge Dennis during his questioning, saying he had 
“monopolized . . . seven minutes.”71  When Judge Dennis asked if he could 
continue with his questioning, Judge Jones asked if he would like to leave, and 
told him she wanted him to “shut up.”72  Judge Dennis responded, saying, 
“[d]on’t tell me to shut up.”73 
Although a judge silencing a party or lawyer by demanding she “shut up” does 
not necessarily show bias on the judge’s part, it does affect the public’s 
perception of whether the proceeding is just.74  Commentators identify certain 
factors as impacting perceptions of procedural fairness, such as: “(1) whether 
the people involved had an opportunity to state their case (“voice”); (2) whether 
the authorities were seen as unbiased, honest, and principled (“neutrality”); (3) 
                                                      
 64. Tobin A. Sparling, Through Different Lenses: Using Psychology to Assess Popular 
Criticism of the Judiciary from the Public’s Perspective, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 471, 500 
(2010). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and 
Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal Institutions?, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 215, 
215 (2001).  See also Hafemeister, Garner & Bath, supra note 17, at 200. 
 67. Tyler, supra note 66, at 216. 
 68. Paul L. Friedman, Taking the High Road: Civility, Judicial Independence, and the Rule 
of Law, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 187, 198 (2001). 
 69. See, e.g., Council, supra note 24.  See also David Lat, Judicial Diva Gone Wild? Chief 
Judge Jones Tells Judge Dennis to ‘Shut Up’, ABOVE THE LAW (Sept. 21, 2011, 7:43 PM),  
http://abovethelaw.com/2011/09/benchslap-of-the-day-chief-judge-jones-tells-judge-dennist-to-
shut-up/; Judge Watkins YOUTUBE Video, supra note 16. 
 70. Council, supra note 24. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Sankar, supra note 63, at 1241–42 (explaining that the public’s perception of the 
fairness of proceedings stems largely from how people are treated by authorities; authorities’ 
demeanor plays a substantial role in this perception). 
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whether the authorities were seen as benevolent and caring (“trustworthiness”); 
and (4) whether the people involved were treated with dignity and respect.”75  
Accordingly, a judge silencing a party in anger, even if doing so does not impact 
the judge’s decision, will probably impact the party’s perception of the 
proceeding’s fairness.  
Arguably, the answer to excessive displays of judicial anger is harsher 
disciplinary action from judicial conduct commissions and courts, the tribunals 
charged with correcting judicial misbehavior.76  One commentator has argued 
that failure to meaningfully discipline judges who commit serious acts of 
misconduct discourages litigants from reporting such behavior to the proper 
authorities.77  For example, the commentator states that a public reprimand and 
$100.00 fine is clearly an insufficient punishment for a particularly egregious 
case of judicial bullying and instead recommends suspension without pay or 
removal.78 
Currently, judicial sanctioning tribunals discipline the worst judicial 
demeanor cases with public sanctions or, less frequently, removal.79  However, 
a public reprimand is arguably inadequate to correct a bullying judge’s behavior, 
but not because of the sanction’s leniency.  Rather, the publicity is likely to 
stigmatize the judge, potentially increasing the judge’s hostility, without 
providing any real behavioral correction. 
II.  TO MORE EFFECTIVELY PROTECT THE PUBLIC, DISCIPLINE SHOULD NOT 
STIGMATIZE THE ANGRY JUDGE 
Apart from removal of a judge by involuntary resignation, the harshest forms 
of discipline are public.  Many judicial conduct commissions list on their 
websites the names and offenses of judges who receive public sanctions.80  
Public sanctions satisfy those who seek transparency in judicial discipline, but 
                                                      
 75. Michael M. O’Hear, Explaining Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 479 (2009).  See 
also Singer, supra note 17, at 1458 (“At the trial court level, where citizens are more likely to 
experience the courts directly, expectations of procedural justice include fair and dignified 
treatment, personal participation or control over some aspect of the proceedings, the opportunity to 
be heard, trustworthiness, and neutrality.”) (citations omitted). 
 76. See Richmond, supra note 4, at 360. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See In re Fuller, 798 N.W.2d 408, 421 (S.D. 2011) (noting that states impose various 
punishments for serious judicial misconduct, ranging from public censure to suspension or 
removal).  In the case of South Dakota Judge Pete Fuller, who gave a lawyer “the finger” during a 
court proceeding and routinely swore in open court, the Supreme Court of South Dakota ordered 
that the judge be involuntarily retired.  Id. at 413–14, 421.  However, the court provided that his 
retirement could be stayed if he met certain conditions.  Id. at 421–22. 
 80. See, e.g., Disciplinary Action, TEX. ST. COMM’N ON JUD. CONDUCT, http://www.scjc. 
state.tx.us/actions.asp (last updated Jan. 29, 2014).  Public Discipline & Decisions 1961-Present, 
ST. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, http://cjp.ca.gov/pub_discipline_and_decisions.htm 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2014). 
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are likely to shame the offending judge.81  Many consider this result to be the 
primary virtue of public discipline.  However, the social science research 
suggests that shaming an already angry judge is likely to increase her anger and 
hostility, rather than motivate positive behavioral changes.82  This is especially 
true today because of the social media effect described in Part IV, which 
exacerbates the judge’s shame by inviting the public’s reaction to the judge.  
Arguably, private sanctions, like removal, may also cause the judge to feel 
shame, as the discipline is meant to express the commission’s disapproval of the 
offending judge’s conduct.83  Therefore, although the disciplinary tribunal’s 
express purpose is not to humiliate the judge, shame is a likely by-product of 
such sanctions.84 
Some believe that shaming an angry judge will incentivize her future good 
behavior and the good behavior of those judges who observe the public shaming.  
                                                      
 81. Some judges are not shame-prone and are therefore unlikely to experience shame as a 
result of a commission or newspaper publicizing their wrongdoing.  C.f. infra notes 93–100 and 
accompanying text (discussing the consequences of being shame-prone).  Arguably, however, most 
judges suffer humiliation or shame as a result of public discipline.  See Dan M. Kahan, What Do 
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 636 (1996) (noting that, generally speaking, 
“offenders punished by shaming penalties are likely to feel shame.”). 
 82. See infra notes 93–100 and accompanying text (exploring research on the effects of 
shame). 
 83. Removal is the most severe form of discipline.  See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, 
Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 384 (1997).  See also Spruance v. Comm’n 
on Judicial Qualifications, 532 P.2d 1209, 1225 (Cal. 1975) (en banc).  In rejecting the lesser 
discipline of a public censure and mandating removal of a judge who participated in ex parte 
communications in criminal cases and made improper comments about counsel, the California 
Supreme Court noted that “[m]ere censure of petitioner would woefully fail to convey our utter 
reproval of any judge who allows malice or other improper personal motivations to infect the 
administration of justice.”  Fletcher v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 968 P.2d 958, 991 (Cal. 
1998) (quoting Spruance, 532 P.2d at 1225). 
 84. Although public discipline imposed on judges is not typically referred to as a “shaming 
penalty,” this discipline shares key attributes with shaming penalties.  With public discipline, the 
judge’s name, misconduct, and discipline are publicized to express the commission’s condemnation 
of the behavior, as well as to invite some level of public participation in the condemnation.  
Similarly, shaming penalties are “designed to humiliate and degrade an offender in public while 
inviting some element of public participation in that humiliation and degradation.”  Dan Markel, 
Wrong Turns on the Road to Alternative Sanctions: Reflections on the Future of Shaming 
Punishments and Restorative Justice, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1389–90 (2007).  In both instances, 
the discipline’s added heft comes from the humiliation the offenders presumably suffer from the 
public response.  Despite the legal community’s rejection of shaming penalties as an effective 
means of correction in the criminal law context (which is meant to be punitive), publicizing 
misbehavior remains one of the harshest forms of discipline that is imposed on misbehaving judges 
(which is not meant to be punitive).  According to disciplinary tribunals, the purpose of imposing 
judicial discipline is generally to protect the public and ensure the integrity of the judiciary.  See, 
e.g., Dodds v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 906 P.2d 1260, 1271 (Cal. 1995) (quoting Furey 
v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 743 P.2d 919, 931 (Cal. 1987)) (“‘The purpose of these 
proceedings is not to punish errant judges but to protect the judicial system and those subject to the 
awesome power that judges wield.’”). 
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However, social science suggests that shame has few benefits.85  In fact, shame 
might actually cause a judge to feel deeper hostility and anger, and prevent 
empathic responses from the judge.86  The once angry judge then becomes the 
deeply isolated and resentful judge.87 
A.  What is Shame, and How Does it Impact Judges? 
Shame is defined as “a painful emotion caused by consciousness of guilt, 
shortcoming, or impropriety.”88  It is a self-conscious emotion in that it involves 
“self evaluating the self.”89  The experiences of shame and guilt differ in that 
shamed individuals feel small and worthless and want to hide or regress, whereas 
the guilty feel tense and remorseful about their behavior.90 
Shameful feelings may motivate prosocial behavior by reinforcing group 
values and thus ensuring that the members of the group conduct themselves 
appropriately.91  Shame also stimulates many types of goal-seeking behavior, 
some of which are socially valuable.92 
For those who are shame-prone,93 however, shame can certainly backfire with 
the offender reacting in anger to discipline that shames.94  According to June 
Tangney, a psychology professor who has researched and written extensively on 
shame and guilt, those who are shame-prone “appear relatively more likely to 
blame others (as well as themselves) for negative events, more prone to a 
                                                      
 85. See JUNE PRICE TANGNEY & RONDA L. DEARING, SHAME AND GUILT 137 (2002) (noting 
that their results demonstrated that “no apparent benefit was derived from the pain of shame [and] 
[t]here was no evidence that shame inhibits problematic behaviors”) 
 86. See id. at 97 (“[S]hame can also motivate defensive feelings of anger and hostility, and a 
tendency to project blame outward.”). 
 87. See id. at 103 (explaining that shame-prone individuals are also likely to be easily 
angered). 
 88. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1073 (10th ed. 2002).  Professor 
Martha Nussbaum defines shame as a feeling of inadequacy, specifically “a painful emotion 
responding to a sense of failure to attain some ideal state.” MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM 
HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 184 (2004).  Other commentators have explained 
that shame “is an extremely painful and ugly feeling that has a negative impact on interpersonal 
behavior.”  TANGNEY & DEARING, supra note 85, at 3.  Embarrassment has been described as a 
less dramatic and less enduring version of shame.  Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: 
Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 645, 668 (1997). 
 89. TANGNEY & DEARING, supra note 85, at 2. 
 90. Id. at 18–19. 
 91. BROCK HANSEN, SHAME AND ANGER: THE CRITICISM CONNECTION 29 (2006).  See also 
Nussbaum, supra note 88, at 211 (“[S]hame can at times be a morally valuable emotion, playing a 
constructive role in development and moral change.”). 
 92. Nussbaum, supra note 88, at 206. 
 93. See June Price Tangney, Kerstin Youman & Jeffrey Stuewig, Proneness to Shame and 
Proneness to Guilt, in HANDBOOK OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 192, 192 
(Mark R. Leary & Rick H. Hoye eds., 2009) (“Shame proneness and guilt proneness are stable 
personality dispositions representing the propensity to experience these moral emotions across time 
and situations.”). 
 94. TANGNEY & DEARING, supra note 85, at 3. 
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seething, bitter, resentful kind of anger and hostility, and less able to empathize 
with others in general.”95  Other social science research also suggests a robust 
correlation between shame-proneness and anger.96  Less shame-prone 
individuals are more likely to use their anger in a constructive manner than are 
their shame-prone counterparts.97  In addition, Tangney posits that shame can 
hinder an empathetic response to another’s feelings.98  This occurs as a result of 
the individual’s intense focus on his or her self, which diverts attention from 
others who may have been hurt by the individual’s behavior.99  The shamed are 
unlikely to accept responsibility for their misbehavior or attempt to regain the 
trust of those whom they wronged.100 
A person’s response to shame depends in part on whether the shame is 
delivered in either a stigmatizing or reintegrative way.101  In the criminal context, 
stigmatizing shame refers to shame that focuses on the person, rather than on the 
behavior.102  This type of shaming labels the offender a deviant and makes no 
effort to de-label or reintegrate the person into his community.103  Reintegrative 
shaming, on the other hand, refers to “expressions of community disapproval, 
which may range from mild rebuke to degradation ceremonies, [that] are 
followed by gestures of reacceptance into the community of law-abiding 
citizens.”104  Rather than reintegrating an individual, publicizing discipline tends 
to stigmatize an offender.105  For example, Tangney explains that in the 
schoolroom context, methods of discipline such as putting students in the corner 
or writing their names on the chalkboard lead to public humiliation and 
                                                      
 95. Id. 
 96. Jeffrey Stuewig, June P. Tangney, Caron Heigel, Laura Harty & Laura McCloskey, 
Shaming, Blaming, and Maiming: Functional Links Among the Moral Emotions, Externalization of 
Blame, and Aggression, 44 J. RES. PERSONALITY, 91, 92 (2010), available at http://www.ncbi. 
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2848360/. 
 97. TANGNEY & DEARING, supra note 85, at 103–04 (explaining that a shame-prone 
individual is likely to engage in aggressive behavior and is not typically inclined to engage in a 
constructive conversation about the behavior with the target of their anger).  See also Tangney, 
Youman & Stuewig, supra note 93, at 200 (noting that “[p]eople suffering from the pain and  
self-diminishment of shame may become defensive and angry and attempt to deflect blame 
outward.”). 
 98. TANGNEY & DEARING, supra note 85, at 81 (stating that “shame can actually interfere 
with an other-oriented empathetic connection.”). 
 99. Id. at 83. 
 100. See Maxine D. Goodman, Removing the Umpire’s Mask: The Propriety and Impact of 
Judicial Apologies, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 1529, 1555–57 (2011) (providing examples of judges who 
apologized for wrongdoing by saying some variation of, “If my behavior offended anyone, I 
apologize.”). 
 101. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 55 (1989). 
 102. See id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See TANGNEY & DEARING, supra note 85, at 187–88. 
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stigmatization of the student.106  Similarly, judicial sanctioning tribunals can 
stigmatize judges by imposing public reprimands for serious and repeated angry 
behavior; these tribunals often post the judges’ names, offenses committed, and 
discipline on a “list of shame” on their websites.107 
B.  Exploring the Theory Behind Shaming Penalties in the Context of Judicial 
Discipline 
Many write about shaming penalties in the criminal law context.108  These 
penalties typically involve broadcasting an offender’s crime in order to “provoke 
communal outrage.”109  Examples of shaming penalties include requiring a 
defendant convicted of killing a man while driving drunk to stand at the crash 
scene wearing a sign saying “I killed Aaron Coy Pennywell While Driving 
Drunk”110 or requiring convicted shoplifters to run advertisements in their local 
newspapers providing their photographs and the crimes they committed.111  A 
Utah juvenile court judge recently agreed to reduce a thirteen-year-old girl’s 
community service for cutting several inches of hair from a three-year-old’s 
head if the girl agreed to have her ponytail cut off in court.112  Recently, a judge 
                                                      
 106. Id. at 188. 
 107. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.  Often, the same angry judge receives more 
than one public reprimand.  See STATE OF CAL. COMM’N ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, SUMMARY 
OF DISCIPLINE STATISTICS 1990-2009 (2009) available at http://cjp.ca.gov/res/docs/ 
Miscellaneous/Statistical_Report_1990-2009.pdf (“Judges who had prior discipline were more 
likely to be disciplined again than judges who had not been disciplined . . . .  [F]rom 2000 to 2009, 
55.7 percent of all discipline was imposed on previously disciplined judges.”).  The most common 
type of misconduct for which the Commission imposed discipline was demeanor/decorum.  Id. at 
14.  Judges may need to be reprimanded more than once because of the stigma that results from 
public discipline; as commentators have suggested, shaming penalties might lead to greater anger 
and hostility on the part of the angry judge. 
 108. See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1088 n.167 (2009) (noting that prominent 
scholars have mixed viewpoints on the virtues of shaming penalties). 
 109. Brian Netter, Avoiding the Shameful Backlash: Social Repercussions for the Increased 
Use of Alternative Sanctions, 96 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 187, 188 (2005).  See also Markel, 
supra note 84, at 1389–90 (“Shaming punishments . . . are penalties designed to humiliate and 
degrade an offender in public while inviting some element of public participation in that humiliation 
and degradation.”). 
 110. See Robert Stanton, Drunken driver must wear sign about his crime, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 
21, 2012, at B3; Texas judge orders convicted drunk driver to public humiliation, FOX NEWS (Apr. 
21, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/04/21/texas-judge-orders-convicted-drunk-driver-to-
public-humiliation. 
 111. See Jan Hoffman, Crime and Punishment: Shame Gains Popularity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 
1997, at A1. 
 112. Lynn DeBruin, ‘Shame’ punishments like ponytail cutting increase, SEATTLE TIMES (June 
25, 2012, 5:50 AM), http://seattletimes.com/avantgo/2018522313.html.  The teen’s mother filed a 
complaint against the judge with the Utah Judicial Conduct Commission.  Id.; Matthew 
Rosenbaum, Haircuts to Signs: Public Shaming to Make Kids Straighten Up, ABC NEWS (June 26, 
2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/Parenting/haircuts-signs-public-shaming-make-kids-straighten/ 
print?id=16655358. 
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ordered a woman who drove on the sidewalk to avoid stopping behind a school 
bus to stand at the intersection where the bus stopped while wearing a sign 
saying, “[o]nly an idiot drives on the sidewalk to avoid a school bus.”113 
Obviously, publicizing a judge’s wrongdoing differs from ordering an 
offender to stand on a street corner with a sign, advertising his offense.  In the 
latter scenario, the offender physically bears the stigma as he publicizes his 
wrongdoing, whereas judges are removed from the public and thus can bear their 
stigma in private.  In Professor Dan Kahan’s continuum of shaming penalties, 
publicizing a judge’s wrongdoing constitutes “stigmatizing publicity,” much 
like identifying sex offenders on websites or in advertisements.114  Stigmatizing 
publicity seeks “to magnify the humiliation inherent in conviction by 
communicating the offender’s status to a wider audience.”115 Publicity adds a 
level of severity to discipline that private corrections lack.  Because many judges 
are elected and thus rely heavily on their professional reputations, bad publicity 
can certainly affect their standing among their peers and possibly even their 
livelihoods. 
Commentators have outlined the virtues and vices of shaming penalties in the 
criminal law arena.116  Proponents of shaming penalties for criminal defendants 
contend that these penalties serve as a valuable alternative to incarceration at a 
time when prison overcrowding presents challenges for the criminal justice 
system.117  Thus, in terms of economics, punishment without imprisonment 
makes sense.118  Others contend that shaming is actually less degrading than 
imprisonment.119  Shaming punishments are also offered as a viable alternative 
to jail because they serve an expressive function, displaying the public’s 
disapproval of the criminal’s conduct, without inflicting physical harm.120 
                                                      
 113. Philip Caulfield, Judge orders cleveland woman to wear an ‘idiot’ sign after she was 
caught driving on a sidewalk to avoid a school bus, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 6, 2012, 10:59 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/woman-wear-idiot-sign-traffic-gaffe-article-
1.1197276. 
 114. See Kahan, supra note 81, at 631–32. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See Gershowitz, supra note 108, at 1089–95; Kahan, supra note 81, at 644–46. 
 117. See Kahan, supra note 81, at 635 (“Much of the appeal [of shaming penalties] is simply 
that they are cheaper than imprisonment.”). 
 118. See Markel, supra note 84, at 1388–89; Aaron S. Book, Note, Shame on You: An Analysis 
of Modern Shame Punishment as an Alternative to Incarceration, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 
680–81 (1999).  Commentators agree on this issue, regardless of their position on shaming 
penalties. 
 119. Dan M. Kahan, Postscript, Unthinkable Misrepresentations: A Response to Tonry, 46 
UCLA L. REV. 1933, 1935 (1999). 
 120. Chad Flanders, Essay, Shame and the Meanings of Punishment, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
609, 611–12 (2006).  See also Kahan, supra note 81, at 635 (explaining that, unlike imprisonment, 
shaming penalties “express appropriate moral condemnation”); Massaro, supra note 88, at 649 
(stating that “[s]haming will clearly promote one end: communicating the shamer’s disgust for the 
offender and offense”). 
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Yet, commentators also challenge the effectiveness and morality of these 
penalties.121  Professor Dan Kahan, once a proponent of shaming penalties, now 
recognizes that shame “is afflicted with a social meaning handicap that, as a 
practical matter, makes it an unacceptable alternate sanction.”122  Thus, Kahan’s 
argument goes, the penalties, if meted out, reflect unacceptable partisanship.123  
Commentators also object to the effectiveness of these sanctions on 
psychological and sociological grounds, contending that shaming may not lead 
to a defendant’s rehabilitation and specific deterrence, but rather to retaliation 
and anger.124  Given this shame-anger cycle, those who advocate shaming 
penalties do so only for nonviolent criminals because they believe that “[t]o 
force a violent offender to undergo public humiliation likely would lead to more 
violence.”125 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of shaming depends on several variables, 
including both the personality of the offender and the community in which the 
penalty is imposed, making the penalties’ value unpredictable.126  The 
“shameless” will not feel the impact, whereas the shame-prone may react with 
anger to the discipline.127  The effectiveness of shaming penalties “depends on 
an offender having attachments to others in whose eyes he or she can, as a result 
of those attachments, suffer shame.”128  Therefore, an offender without 
attachments will not feel shamed, despite being admonished for his 
wrongdoing.129  However, Toni Massaro explains that traditional shaming 
penalties have unpredictable behavioral consequences that “may include anger 
and a desire to retaliate against the one inflicting shame.”130  Massaro also warns 
against shaming proponents’ “relative indifference” to this unpredictability.131  
In summary, commentators do advocate for shaming to correct behavior in other 
                                                      
 121. See Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and 
the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2216 (2001) 
(arguing that shaming penalties are misguided as corrections when the goal is retributive because 
the state, not the public, is meant to impose punishment); NUSSBAUM, supra note 88, at 229–30 
(noting that one criticism of shaming penalties is that they strip offenders of their dignity). 
 122. Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075, 
2075–76 (2006). 
 123. See id. 
 124. Massaro, supra note 88, at 648.  But see Book, supra note 118, at 675 (stating that shaming 
has been shown to be psychologically effective). 
 125. Book, supra note 118, at 683–84. 
 126. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1811 (2001) 
(explaining that “[s]haming sanctions work best in close-knit communities in which citizens 
interact frequently and share common values”). 
 127. See Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 
748–49 (1998). 
 128. Id. at 748. 
 129. Id. at 784–49. 
 130. Massaro, supra note 88, at 648. 
 131. Id. 
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areas of the law,132 yet, on balance, recent scholarship weighs against shaming 
penalties in the criminal arena. 
The lessons derived from the use of shaming penalties in other contexts 
suggest that disciplining an angry judge with public sanctions might exacerbate 
the judge’s anger and hostility.  The goal of sanctioning judges is not to punish 
the offending judge, but rather to protect the public, which often includes 
rehabilitating the judge, and attempting to deter future wrongdoing.133  The 
consequences of shaming a judge who has engaged in particularly egregious or 
repeated displays of hostility are unpredictable at best,134 and destructive at 
worst.135 
Commentators who advocate for using shame in discipline often do so in the 
context of restorative justice where the shame is reintegrative.  Reintegrative 
shame involves an initial expression of disapproval of the behavior rather than 
the offender, and focuses on reintegrating the offender into his community.136  
This approach requires a process that the offender feels is just and one that 
surrounds the offender with members of his community.137  The path to 
restorative justice is completely unlike the typical judicial disciplinary process 
in which a judicial conduct commission, typically made up of judges, lawyers, 
and non-lawyers, prosecutes the dispute in an adversarial setting.138  Shame from 
the judicial disciplinary process, exacerbated by the social media effect, is thus 
isolating, not reintegrative. 
C.  Potential Virtues of Shaming Penalties for Judges 
Some may contend that public sanctions like shaming are fitting for judges 
because they are the only type of discipline that will get their attention.  In light 
                                                      
 132. See, e.g., Gershowitz, supra note 108, at 1062–63 (arguing that courts should publicize 
the names of prosecutors who engage in misconduct because without such public shaming, 
prosecutors experience little pressure to act appropriately); Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming 
Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 664 (2011) (arguing that small businesses should use 
shaming to both punish trademark bullies and deter others from engaging in similar behavior); 
Skeel, supra note 126, at 1812–13 (explaining that the shaming of corporations, both by the courts 
and private entities, is particularly effective because corporations and their directors have very 
strong interests in their reputations). 
 133. See In re Hocking, 546 N.W.2d 234, 245 (Mich. 1996) (“[O]ur primary charge is to 
fashion a penalty that maintains the honor and the integrity of the judiciary, deters similar conduct, 
and furthers the administration of justice . . . .  We must carefully maintain the distinction between 
protection and punishment.”). 
 134. See Massaro, supra note 88, at 648. 
 135. See Susan Hanley Duncan, Restorative Justice and Bullying: A Missing Solution in the 
Anti-Bullying Laws, 37 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 267, 285–86 (2011). 
 136. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 101, at 55. 
 137. Id. (noting that “[t]he nub of this deterrence is not the severity of the sanction but its social 
embeddedness; shame is more deterring when administered by persons who continue to be of 
importance to us.”). 
 138. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, State Judicial Conduct Organizations, 76 KY. L.J. 811, 811–12 
(1988) (explaining the basic structure of most judicial conduct systems). 
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of the heavy emphasis on judge’s reputations, the argument goes, public 
sanctions should motivate prosocial behavior by judges.  Along the same lines, 
some may argue that the social media effect, which can produce results ranging 
from harsh public criticism to death threats, is fitting punishment because the 
angry judge deserves whatever collateral, unintended consequences flow from 
the discipline.  Additionally, as individuals concerned with their public image, 
judges may be more impacted by their community’s negative perception of 
them, making rehabilitative justice more appropriate for them than it is for blue-
collar criminals.139 
However, anecdotal evidence does not support the idea that shaming a judge 
will reform her angry behavior,140 and empirical evidence is scarce.141  
Additionally, if the goal of judicial discipline is as disciplinary tribunals say it  
is — to protect the public, not punish the offender142 — this argument fails.  For 
ordinary criminals, discipline is meant to punish, and discipline has well-known 
objectives including deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, and incapacitation 
(for incarceration).143  But for judicial discipline to meet its objective of guiding 
judges and protecting the public, it should not be assessed by the extent of the 
judge’s humiliation as a result of his misconduct but rather by the discipline’s 
effectiveness in correcting the judge’s angry behavior. 
                                                      
 139. C.f. Mirela V. Hristova, The Case for Insider-Trading Criminalization and Sentencing 
Reform, 13 TRANSACTIONS 267, 268 (2012). 
 140. The available anecdotal evidence includes several examples of angry judges who continue 
to display anger in the courtroom, despite being sanctioned.  For instance, King County District 
Court Judge Judith Eiler became notorious for her hostile behavior, particularly toward pro se 
litigants.  See In re Eiler, 236 P.3d 873, 874–75 (Wash. 2010) (en banc).  Over the course of about 
eight years, Judge Eiler was accused of repeatedly addressing litigants in a rude and condescending 
manner.  Id. at 875.  On August 5, 2010, the Washington Supreme Court of Washington suspended 
Judge Eiler for five days without pay.  Id.  Five years before her 2010 suspension, Judge Eiler had 
been reprimanded for exhibiting similarly hostile behavior.  Id.  The judicial conduct commission 
that investigated the 2010 case censured Judge Eiler and recommended a ninety day unpaid 
suspension.  Id.  In rejecting the recommendation and instead imposing a five-day suspension, the 
Washington Supreme Court noted the ineffectiveness of the 2005 discipline in motivating Judge 
Eiler to adjust her courtroom demeanor, and acknowledged the severity of a ninety-day suspension.  
Id. at 882.  In any event, the court ultimately held that “[i]t [was] clear that a second reprimand or 
censure without any suspension at all would [have been] too lenient.”  Id. 
 141. See Abel, supra note 12, at 1031–33 (noting the lack of empirical data on judicial 
discipline). 
 142. See, e.g., In re Davis, 82 S.W.3d 140, 150 (Tex. Spec. Ct. Rev. 2002) (“However, we are 
not charged with punishing but with providing guidance to judges and protection to the public.”). 
 143. See Forst, supra note 10, at 1262 (noting that the typical objectives of criminal punishment 
include deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, and incapacitation).  According to Jeremy Bentham, 
“[t]he immediate principal end of punishment is to control action.”  JEREMY BENTHAM, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 170 (1963). 
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III.  THE SOCIAL MEDIA EFFECT 
Today, transparency is “in,”144 and commentators, including lawyers and the 
public, have criticized the secretive nature of judicial discipline proceedings.145  
In a democracy, the argument goes, the public is entitled to know about the 
behavior of its public figures.146  This argument is particularly compelling when 
judges are elected, as most state court judges are.147 
Yet, regardless of what sanction a judicial conduct tribunal imposes (or 
sometimes even before a sanctioning tribunal gets involved), judges’ angry 
outbursts will often be publicized via social media because of the public’s 
fascination with misbehaving judges.148  The lack of transparency of formal 
judiciary disciplinary proceedings is often remedied by informal means.  
Websites such as RobeProbe,149 Above the Law,150 Citizens for Legal 
Responsibility,151 Citizens for Judicial Accountability,152 and Very Bad 
Judges153 are devoted to documenting and publicizing judicial behavior. 
This phenomenon is changing the disciplinary landscape in terms of not only 
what the public knows about judges, but also the consequences of judges’ 
misbehavior.  Arguably, as a result of the social media effect, the judge suffers 
the impact of public criticism in addition to any discipline for wrongdoing.  For 
those judges who are elected officials, the media attention can have very real 
consequences, including a loss of livelihood.154  For the shame-prone judge, this 
                                                      
 144. See, e.g., MARTY MAKARY, UNACCOUNTABLE 5–6 (2012) (advocating for greater 
transparency in the health care industry in order to improve hospital practices); DON TAPSCOTT & 
DAVID TICOLL, THE NAKED CORPORATION: HOW THE AGE OF TRANSPARENCY WILL 
REVOLUTIONIZE BUSINESS xi–xv (2003) (highlighting the value of corporate transparency). 
 145. See Glenn Puit, ACLU Lawsuit: Secrecy of Judicial Complaints Targeted, LAS VEGAS 
REV.-J. Nov. 22, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR 440316; supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 146. See David A. Harris, Essay, The Appearance of Justice: Court TV, Conventional 
Television, and Public Understanding of the Criminal Justice System, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 785,  
794–95 (1993) (citing JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 1–3 (1949)). 
 147. Most states elect at least some of their judges.  Sankar, supra note 63, at 1250. 
 148. See The Honorable Dana M. Levitz, So, You Think You Want to Be a Judge, 38 U. BALT. 
L. REV. 57, 57 (2008) (“The American public is fascinated by judges.  How else do you explain 
Judge Wapner, Judge Ed Koch, Judge Judy, Judge Roy Brown, Judge Joe Brown, Judge Hatchett, 
etc.?”). 
 149. About, ROBEPROBE, http://robeprobe.com/about.php (last visited Apr. 6 2014) referring 
to itself as the “[w]orld’s most trusted judge rating site.”). 
 150. About, ABOVE THE LAW, http://abovethelaw.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). 
 151. CITIZENS FOR LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY, http://clr.org (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). 
 152. CITIZENS FOR JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, http://www.judicialaccountability.net (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2014).  This website claims to expose “the denial of fundamental rights by judges 
and lawyers who place themselves not only above the law, but beyond the law . . . .”  Id. 
 153. VERY BAD JUDGES, http://verybadjudges.blogspot.com (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). 
 154. See, e.g., Judicial Elections-Alhambra Municipal Court-Michael A. Kanner and Dennis 
Orfirer-Election Challenger Orfirer Points to Judge Kanner’s Public Reproval, METROPOLITAN 
NEWS COMPANY (Jan. 25, 1996), http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmp 
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stigmatizing publicity would certainly exacerbate the impact of any shame 
flowing from the judge’s misdeeds, as the public’s response often targets the 
judge himself, not just the judge’s misdeeds.155 
A.  Case Studies Demonstrating the Impact of the Social Media Effect 
In the instances described below, the public not only learned of the judge’s 
behavior through means other than public discipline by a judicial conduct 
commission, but also appeared to drive the disciplinary process.  These three 
examples illustrate the social media effect: the role social media and the press 
play in stigmatizing the judge and in affecting the formal disciplinary process. 
1.  Judge William Adams 
In 2011, Aransas County, Texas Court-at-Law Judge William Adams gained 
notoriety when his twenty-three-year-old daughter posted a video on YouTube 
showing the judge violently beating her with a belt.156  After the tape “went 
viral” on YouTube, getting over 7 million hits,157 the Texas Supreme Court 
suspended Judge Adams indefinitely with pay, and the Texas State Commission 
on Judicial Conduct commenced an investigation into Judge Adams’ alleged 
wrongdoing.158  The public’s reaction was immediate and wide reaching.  Judge 
                                                      
FBSel=all&totaldocs (describing a situation in which a lawyer attempted to defeat a judicial 
election by publicizing a commission’s reproval of the judge).  See also Judge Michael Kanner 
Says He Won’t Seek Reelection, METROPOLITAN NEWS COMPANY (Oct. 22, 2001), 
http://www.metnews.com/articles/kann102201.htm (explaining that the judge ultimately won 
reelection, but the race was “hotly contested”).  But see infra notes 170–85 (describing the 
sanctioning of Judge Sharon Keller and how she came to remain on the bench following the 
negative findings of a judicial commission). 
 155. See TANGNEY & DEARING, supra note 93, at 103–04 (highlighting the link between 
shame-proneness and anger). 
 156. See Ruling Against Judge Seen Beating Daughter, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/us/ruling-against-judge-seen-beating-daughter.html?_r=0.  
The public did not learn of this incident via angry courtroom behavior or a complaint filed against 
the judge, but rather from the online posting. 
 157. See Shoehedgie, Judge William Adams beats daughter for using the internet . . ., 
YOUTUBE (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wl9y3SIPt7o.  An Aransas County 
attorney told the press that when Judge Adams’ daughter posted the video, Judge Adams’ office 
was inundated with emails and calls, including some from outside the United States.  Joe Sutton & 
Ed Payne, Judge In Video Beating Seeks Reinstatement; Ex-Wife Is Opposed, FOX 2 NOW (Oct. 4, 
2012, 11:55 AM), http://fox2now.com/2012/10/04/judge-in-video-beating-seeks-reinstatement-ex-
wife-is-opposed/. 
 158. See Sutton & Payne, supra note 157. 
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Adams received death threats,159 and protestors demanded that he resign.160  Due 
in part to the public outcry, the judicial conduct commission released a public 
statement explaining that it was investigating the matter and asking that no 
additional complaints be filed.161 
Ultimately, the commission disciplined Judge Adams with a public warning 
because the videotape “cast reasonable doubt on his capacity to act impartially 
as a judge and interfered with the proper performance of his judicial  
duties . . . .”162  In addition, the commission referenced the testimony of attorneys 
who regularly practiced before Judge Adams, describing incidents in which he 
lost his temper at lawyers in his courtroom, specifically the former Aransas 
County Attorney.163  The commission concluded that Judge Adams violated 
Canons 3B(4) and 4A of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, as well as  
Article V, § 1-a(6)A of the Texas Constitution.164 
Today, Judge Adams is back on the bench, serving the remainder of his term 
that will end in in 2014;165 the Texas Supreme Court reinstated him after he 
agreed not to challenge the public warning.166  In terms of the public’s response 
to Judge Adams, a Facebook page titled “Don’t Re-elect Judge William Adams” 
has attracted more than 31,000 likes167 and a page titled “Prosecute Judge 
                                                      
 159. Jon Bershad, After Police Investigation Open, Texas Judge Response To Beating Video: 
‘It’s Not As Bad As It Looks On Tape’, MEDIAITE (Nov. 2, 2011, 3:28 PM), http://www.mediaite. 
com/online/after-police-investigation-opens-texas-judge-responds-to-beating-video-its-not-as-
bad-as-it-looks-on-tape/. 
 160. Daniel Tovrov, Judge William Adams: Protesters Demand Judge’s Resignation, 
INTERNATIONAL BUS. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2011, 11:52 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/judge-william-
adams-protesters-demand-judges-resignation-366896. 
 161. Public Statement: No. PS-2012-1, Tex. State Comm’n on Jud. Conduct (Nov. 2, 2011), 
available at http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/pdf/PublicStatement.pdf. 
 162. Public Warning: Honorable William Adams County Court at Law Judge Rockport, 
Aransas County, Texas, Tex. State Comm’n on Jud. Conduct (Sept. 4, 2012), available at 
http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id.  The Texas Constitution permits judicial discipline in response to “willful or persistent 
conduct that is clearly inconsistent with the proper performance of [a judge’s] duties or casts public 
discredit upon the judiciary or the administration of justice.”  TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1-a(6)(A). 
 165. Judge suspended in video beating returns to bench, HOUS. CHRON. (Nov. 11, 2012), 
http://www.chron/com/neighborhood//news/houston-texas/article/Suspension-lifted-for-judge-
who-beat-daughter-4013671.php; Texas judge suspended after video showed him beating his 
daughter returns to bench, FOX NEWS (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/11/14/ 
texas-judge-suspended-after-video-showed-him-beating-daughter-returns-to-bench. 
 166. Approval of Agreed Motion to Lift Order of Suspension of Judge, No. 12-9137 (Tex. 
Nov. 6, 2012).  Judge Adams’ former wife has publicly opposed his returning to the bench, telling 
the press that she wants to “protect the public from being judged by a person that I feel does not 
have the capacity to act fairly and effectively as a judge as evidence[d] [by] how he has treated his 
own family over the years.”  Sutton & Payne, supra note 157. 
 167. Don’t Re-Elect Judge William Adams, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/pages/ 
Dont-Re-Elect-Judge-Wlliam-Adams/217089511694481 (last visited Apr. 7, 2014). 
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William Adams” has over 700 likes.168  Because of the threats the judge received 
after the video was released, the Aransas County courthouse where Judge Adams 
presides now has additional security, including metal detectors at the building’s 
entrance.169 
2.  Judge Sharon Keller 
In another example of a strong public reaction to judicial behavior, on 
September 25, 2007, Judge Sharon Keller, then the Presiding Judge of the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals, infamously refused to keep her clerk’s office open 
outside business hours, even though late filings are typical on days when 
executions are scheduled.170  As a result of her refusal, lawyers for Michael 
Richard were unable to file a last-minute appeal and Richard was executed later 
that night.171 
In February 2009, the Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct sent 
Judge Keller a notice advising her that the Commission had initiated formal 
proceedings against her as a result of the incident.172  The Texas Supreme Court 
appointed Texas State District Court Judge David Berchelmann, Jr. as Special 
Master to conduct the necessary hearings and make a recommendation to the 
commission on the matter.173  Following a hearing, the Special Master concluded 
that although Judge Keller’s conduct was not exemplary, she did not engage in 
conduct so egregious to warrant removal from office.174  The Special Master also 
remarked that her actions did not warrant any sanction “beyond the public 
humiliation she has surely suffered.”175 
In June 2010, the commission disregarded the Special Master’s conclusions 
and voted to impose a public warning against Judge Keller, finding that she 
committed several violations of the Texas Constitution and the Texas Code of 
Judicial Conduct, including “willful or persistent conduct that casts public 
discredit on the judiciary.”176  However, a Special Court of Review reversed this 
decision on the grounds that the commission lacked the authority to impose this 
                                                      
 168. Prosecute Judge William Adams, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/pages/ 
prosecute-Judge-William-Adams/235101293218440 (last visited Apr. 7, 2014). 
 169. Texas judge suspended after video showed him beating daughter returns to bench, supra 
note 165. 
 170. Gretel C. Kovach, A Texas Judge, Accused of Misconduct, Draws Mixed Opinions on Her 
Fairness, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, at A14. 
 171. Id. 
 172. In re Keller, No. 10-0001, at 2 (Tex. Spec. Ct. Rev. Oct. 11, 2010), available at 
http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/tx/20101011_Final_Opinion.pdf. 
 172. Id. at 3. 
 173. Id. at 3. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 5–7. 
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sanction under the Texas Constitution.177  Therefore, the Special Court of 
Review vacated the commission’s order and dismissed the commission’s 
charging document against Judge Keller.178 
Judge Keller’s actions and the resulting disciplinary action received a 
substantial amount of press.  Not only did individuals weigh in on the case 
against Judge Keller, but organized groups protested her conduct, her continued 
tenure on the bench, and the commission’s actions and decisions.  For example, 
in a novel type of pleading, a group of twenty-four “judicial ethics experts” 
submitted an “Ethics Experts’ Declaration” to the commission during the 
pendency of the proceeding,179 alleging Judge Keller violated judicial ethical 
rules by “deciding cases despite her lack of impartiality and the appearance of 
impartiality, which required that she recuse herself . . . .”180  A separate group of 
individuals from the Texas Moratorium Network created a website, 
“sharonkiller.com,” aimed at notifying the public of Judge Keller’s conduct and 
the commission’s response.181 
On June 26, 2012, several former presidents of the Texas Criminal Defense 
Lawyers Association posted an article on the Huffington Riposte blog, urging 
readers to contribute to the campaign of Judge Keller’s opponent, Keith 
Hampton.182  The blog states that Judge Keller “brought national embarrassment 
to the Texas judiciary and legal system” when she refused to keep her clerk’s 
office open late on the date of Richard’s execution.183  On November 6, 2012, 
Judge Keller won reelection to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.184  
                                                      
 177. Id. at 34–35.  Pursuant to the Texas Constitution and Code, the only available remedy was 
to dismiss the charging document; issuing a public warning was not available to the commission as 
a sanction.  Id. 
 178. Id. at 35. 
 179. Mary Alice Robbins, Ethics Experts Claim CCA Presiding Judge Sharon Keller Should 
Go, TEX. LAW., (Apr. 27, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.texaslawyer.com/id=1202430175566.  
The commission did not solicit the Declaration and was unfamiliar with this type of submission.  
Id. 
 180. Ethics Experts’ Declaration at 1, Inquiry Concerning a Judge, No. 96 (Tex. State Comm’n 
Judicial Conduct Apr. 20, 2009), available at http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/tx/TEXAS.pdf. 
 181. Sharon Keller Gets off on Technicality; Reputation of Texas Judiciary Still Tarnished, 
SHARONKILLER.COM, http://sharonkiller.com/ (last visited May 14, 2014).  The home page argues 
that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals should impeach Judge Keller and remove her from office.  
Id. 
 182. Presiding Judge Sharon Keller Must Go!, HUFFINGTON RIPOSTE (June 26, 2012), 
huffingtonriposte.blogspot.com/2012/06/presiding-judge-sharon-keller-must-go.html. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Terrence Stutz, Sharon Keller re-elected to Texas criminal appeals court; Geraldine 
Miller leads in education board race, DALLAS NEWS (Nov. 6, 2012, 11:38 PM), 
www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/state-politics/20121106-sharon-keller-re-elected.  According 
to Keller, death penalty opponents protested at her house and she received “at least one credible 
death threat” as a result of the controversy.  See Michael Graczyk, Judge Sharon Keller speaks out 
after reprimand tossed, DALLAS NEWS (Oct. 20, 2010, 8:41 AM), http://www.dallasnews.com/ 
news/state/headlines/20101020-Judge-Sharon-Keller-speaks-out-after-7068.ece. Keller considered 
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Commentators opine she was reelected because of the large percentage of 
Republican straight-ticket voters in Harris County.185 
3.  Judge William Watkins 
A third example of widespread publicity of judicial misbehavior and a strong, 
negative public reaction occurred when Judge William Watkins was caught on 
camera screaming at Arthur Hage, as described in Part I of this Article.186  
YouTube users posted many comments in response to the video, labeling Judge 
Watkins “a piece of human garbage,” calling for him to be put “behind bars,” 
and suggesting he needs anger management classes.187  One commentator wrote: 
“This worries me!  My boyfriend . . . and I have to go before him tomorrow over 
child support for our special needs child[.]  I hope he don’t [sic] scream at me . 
. . .”188 
B.  What these Examples Demonstrate about the Public’s Role in Judicial 
Discipline 
As these examples show, any void in the transparency of judicial misconduct 
and resulting discipline is often filled by informal means, through the traditional 
press and social media.  Some will look favorably on the publicity and the 
public’s ability to weigh in on the judge’s conduct.  However, the publicity and 
resulting public reaction is troubling because it changes the consequences a 
judge suffers for her misbehavior.  Regardless of whether the judge “deserves” 
the public reaction and resulting humiliation or anger, these consequences differ 
markedly from what disciplinary tribunals intend judges to experience as a result 
of public discipline. 
IV.  IN LIGHT OF THE SOCIAL MEDIA EFFECT AND LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF 
SHAMING AN ANGRY JUDGE, CORRECTIONS SHOULD BE PREVENTIVE, 
CONSTRUCTIVE, AND RESTORATIVE 
Disciplinary tribunals should either remove an offending judge or strive to 
correct his behavior without stigmatizing or alienating him.  Restorative justice 
provides insight into how to use shame while avoiding its stigmatizing impact; 
organizations involved in educating judges and regulating their behavior should 
use these insights to make today’s discipline more effective at rehabilitating the 
                                                      
resigning, but decided against it because she did not want to appear to have surrendered to the 
pressure. 
 185. See Kolten Parker, Past haunts judge seeking re-election, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 24 2012), 
http://www.chron.com/news/politics/article/Keller-faces-opponent-and-her-history-in-November-
3979348.php. 
 186. See supra notes 25–36 and accompanying text. 
 187. Judge Watkins YOUTUBE Video, supra note 16, at “Top Comments.” 
 188. Id. 
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angry judge.  This approach would strive to make shame reintegrative, rather 
than simply stigmatizing.189 
At the outset, organizations involved in educating judges and regulating 
judicial behavior should strive to keep judges out of the disciplinary process by 
employing informal means of correcting misbehavior before it becomes serious 
or frequent.  Bar associations, lawyers’ assistance programs, the American 
Judicature Society,190 and judicial education organizations191 should aim to 
educate judges not only about proper judicial demeanor, but also about how to 
maintain this demeanor during their time on the bench.  Given that a judge is 
most likely to respond to corrections from someone whom he trusts,192 
corrections should include peer-to-peer meetings about angry behavior, ideally 
before the behavior escalates in severity or frequency.  Furthermore, to the extent 
possible, reconciliation-type meetings with the offended lawyer or party would 
serve as a valuable tool for correcting a judge’s angry behavior. 
A.  Continuing and Introductory Judicial Education 
Education, for both new and more seasoned judges, should emphasize both 
the importance of demeanor and how to maintain it while on the bench.  Judges 
should be taught and continually reminded about the importance of procedural 
fairness, regulating their emotions, decision fatigue, and the many stressors 
accompanying judging that can impact demeanor.  Any judicial education 
should start with the premise that courtesy in the courtroom is important because 
participants in the legal system assess fairness on the basis of how they are 
treated.193 Resources concerning procedural fairness should be made available 
to all judges.  Judges should also be taught about emotional intelligence so that 
they can regulate their emotions instead of trying to suppress them.194  In this 
                                                      
 189. See infra Part IV.C. 
 190. See About AJS, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, http://www.ajs.org/about (last visited Apr. 8, 
2014) (explaining that the American Judicature Society was formed to “promote[] fair and impartial 
courts through research, publications, education, and advocacy for judicial reform.”). 
 191. See, e.g., About Us, TEX. CTR. FOR JUDICIARY, http://yourhonor.com/about (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2014) (explaining that the Texas Center for the Judiciary’s mission of “Judicial Excellence 
Through Education” is fulfilled “on a daily basis in a variety of ways including continuing judicial 
education programs, new judge mentoring programs, an integrated curriculum design, 
comprehensive faculty development, and the development of Bench Books and online resources 
for Texas judges.”); Education, JUDICIAL EDUC. CENTER, http://jec.unm.edu/education (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2014) (providing resources for New Mexico judges). 
 192. See infra notes 219–21 and accompanying text. 
 193. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 73 (1990).  As Terry Maroney explains 
in her article about angry judges: “[t]hough complete suppression of judges’ emotions is not a 
worthy goal, regulation of these emotions is . . . .   The innate human capacity for regulation allows 
us continually to try and steer the emotional course best suited to the situation at hand.”  Maroney, 
supra note 2, at 1217. 
 194. See Maroney, supra note 2, at 1217. 
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way, judges could be better prepared for the challenges of serving as “the 
decider.”195 
This education should be available for all judges, not just those who exhibit 
anger and hostility in the courtroom.  Judicial disciplinary organizations should 
work to preempt judges from engaging in angry behavior by making this 
education typical for all members of the judiciary.196  In addition, judicial 
training organizations should teach judicial support personnel about the role 
decision fatigue may play in the judge’s behavior and decision-making.  Support 
staff can be trained to ensure that judges take breaks throughout the day; even a 
short break before the end of a crowded docket may replenish the judge’s mental 
reserves.197  Ultimately, support personnel may prove valuable in recognizing 
the signs of increasing strain and helping judges cope with the stress of decision-
making. 
In 2009, the American Bar Association (ABA) approved a resolution urging 
states to establish voluntary education programs intended to provide those 
considering a judicial career a better understanding of the judge’s role and 
responsibilities.198  A study group of the ABA’s Standing Committee on Judicial 
Independence has also recommended some type of formal preparation for those 
who hope to be judges.199  Programs providing Introductory Judicial Education 
(IJE) would develop “a cadre of potential jurists who have exhibited the interest 
and the commitment to acquire an extra educational credential that potentially 
could make them better qualified for the judiciary than other lawyers.”200 
Professor Keith Fisher, who contributed to a symposium held to determine the 
value of IJE, has identified “[d]eclining [p]ublic [c]onfidence in the [j]udiciary” 
as one of the key reasons for such programs.201  Fisher also highlighted the need 
for judges to treat parties and lawyers in their courtrooms with dignity and 
respect.202 In light of the negative perceptions of the judiciary, largely based on 
some judges’ angry behavior, Fisher proposed that an IJE curriculum could 
include courses in developing listening skills, identifying personality conflicts, 
                                                      
 195. George W. Bush coined this term to mean the person responsible for making countless 
difficult decisions.  See ROY F. BAUMEISTER & JOHN TIERNEY, WILLPOWER: REDISCOVERING THE 
GREATEST HUMAN STRENGTH 90 (2011). 
 196. See Keith R. Fisher, Education for Legal Aspirants, 43 AKRON L. REV. 163, 164 (2010) 
(highlighting that many judges are ill-prepared for the various challenges associated with being a 
judge). 
 197. See Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav & Liora Avnaim-Pesso, Extraneous Factors in 
Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 6889, 6892 (2011) (presenting evidence 
suggesting that a judge’s “tendency to rule in favor of the status quo” can be combatted by taking 
a break and eating). 
 198. Fisher, supra note 196, at 164. 
 199. Id. at 169–70. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 189. 
 202. Id. at 188. 
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docket management, financial planning, and proper treatment of court personnel, 
among other topics.203 
IJE or on-the-job education during a judge’s tenure, could prove costly, 
particularly if it is well executed.  However, this cost should be weighed against 
the expenses required for state judicial conduct commissions to investigate and 
process complaints about angry judges, along with the added costs of state courts 
reviewing the commissions’ decisions. 
B.  Peer-to-Peer Mentoring and Counseling 
Ideally, methods of correcting judicial behavior should adhere to the same 
principle of procedural fairness set forth earlier in this Article: people perceive 
the fairness of proceedings in which they are involved based on whether the 
relevant legal authorities treated them with dignity.204  Similarly, procedural 
justice adherents suggest that when the disciplinary process treats people fairly 
and with dignity, they will view laws and authorities as more legitimate and 
more worthy of their respect.205  People then become self-regulating.206 
This notion of procedural fairness is particularly important as it relates to 
discipline that stigmatizes.  When shame makes an offender feel like an outcast, 
alienated from his community, the offender is likely to reject the sanctioning 
authority and thus fail to experience the prosocial consequences of the shame.207  
Shaming works most effectively to modify offending when someone who is 
important to the offender imposes it.208 
In the context of judicial discipline, this research suggests that the more a 
judge feels that the judicial disciplinary process is fair and administered by a 
trusted authority, the more likely the judge is to cooperate with the process and 
follow the governing ethical guidelines.209  Although not yet studied, some 
judges appear to distrust the process and the sanctioning bodies; these judges 
seem to believe that discipline is meted out arbitrarily.210  Furthermore, judicial 
conduct commissions are not the judge’s community, nor are they composed 
entirely of members of the judge’s community.211  Accordingly, to the extent 
                                                      
 203. Id. at 194–99. 
 204. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. 
 205. Tyler, supra note 19, at 308. 
 206. Id. 
 207. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 101, at 55. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See supra notes 17–19, 136–37 and accompanying text. 
 210. See, e.g., Graczyk, supra note 284 (explaining that Judge Sharon Keller was critical of 
the Texas Commission of Judicial Conduct, complaining that it often overstepped its authority).  
Additionally, lawyers who represented Judge Nathan Hecht before the Texas Judicial Conduct 
Commission complained that discipline by the Commission is “arbitrary and capricious; they just 
do what they want to do . . . .”  Dexheimer, supra note 5. 
 211. See, e.g., Members & Meetings, COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, http://cjp.ca.gov 
/members_meetings.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2014) (explaining that the California Commission on 
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possible, and especially with respect to minor demeanor issues that have not yet 
escalated to formal disciplinary matters, the corrections process should be 
modified to allow a community of a judge’s peers to implement remedial 
measures. 
Organizations that facilitate peer-to-peer counseling already exist, but are 
generally used for other types of challenges.212  In the context of stress and 
alcohol and drug abuse, judges can participate in peer-to-peer counseling 
through state bar Lawyer Assistance Programs.213  These programs help judges 
identify substance abuse and mental health problems, and promote early 
intervention and treatment.214  These programs often provide confidential peer 
mentoring by other judges who have experienced similar problems.215  Judges 
typically volunteer for these programs, both as mentors and mentees.  For 
example, the Texas Lawyers Assistance Program maintains a database of 
volunteer judges who are wiling to provide support to other judges struggling 
with substance abuse or mental health disorders.216  The Texas program also 
provides contact information for the ABA’s Judges Helping Judges National 
Hotline, a program designed to help judges obtain assistance for themselves or 
their colleagues while maintaining confidentiality.217 
Accordingly, state bar associations that have not already done so should 
establish programs like Judges Helping Judges, or at least expand the scope of 
existing programs to offer informal, confidential means of resolving demeanor 
problems (not just substance abuse issues) before formal disciplinary 
proceedings are initiated.  Ideally, judicial conduct commissions could then refer 
                                                      
Judicial Performance is composed of eleven members: one appellate court judge, two Superior 
Court judges, two attorneys, and six lay citizens). 
 212. Some jurisdictions offer mentoring opportunities for both new judges and more seasoned 
judges who face particular challenges.  Judicial Resources, TEX. CENTER FOR JUDICIARY, 
https://www.yourhonor.com/judicial-resources (last visited Apr. 9, 2014) (establishing a “Find a 
Mentor” program).  In addition, certain judicial conduct commissions specifically allow mentoring 
in lieu of traditional discipline.  See, e.g., TEX. CONST., art. V, § 1-a(8) (permitting the Judicial 
Conduct Commission to, after an investigation, require a judge to obtain “additional training or 
education”); N.M. JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMM’N R. 33(C) (2010), available at   
http://nmjsc.org/docs/SKMBT_C55210041915041.pdf (allowing for “[n]on-disciplinary 
dispositions,” including “professional counseling, mentorship, or other assistance for the judge.”). 
 213. See, e.g., Texas Lawyers Assistance Program, ST. BAR TEX., http://www.texasbar.com/ 
AM/Template.cfm?Section=Judges1&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=15127 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2014); New Mexico and Judges Assistance Program, ST. BAR N.M., 
http://www.nmbar.org/JLAP/JLAP.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2014). 
 214. See, e.g., New Mexico and Judges Assistance Program, supra note 213. 
 215. See, e.g., Texas Lawyers Assistance Program, supra note 213. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id.  See also AM. BAR ASS’N, 2010 COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF LAWYER ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAMS 14–22 (2010) available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ 
legalservices/colap/downloads/20110311_aba_2010_colap_comprehensive_survey.authcheckdam
.pdf (providing a comprehensive look at the services provided by Lawyers Assistance Programs 
and Lawyers and Judges Assistance Programs as well as data on the funding sources, clients served, 
and resources provided for each state’s program). 
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allegations of minor wrongdoing by angry judges (i.e., complaints that would 
otherwise typically be dismissed or result in a private warning after 
investigation) to these informal programs for resolution by mentoring, 
counseling, or a reconciliation meeting.  Such a partnership between judge 
assistance programs and judicial conduct commissions, which the American 
Judicature Society encourages,218 would help prevent judicial demeanor 
problems from ever escalating to formal judicial misconduct charges. 
Along the same lines, former Los Angeles Superior Court Judge David 
Rothman recommends that judges undertake their own informal correction 
methods when confronted with judicial demeanor issues.219  Specifically, Judge 
Rothman suggests that based on a judge’s duty to take corrective action,220 
judges should undertake informal processes to mentor or otherwise correct the 
behavior of other judges who violate rules of judicial conduct.  This could 
include a reconciliation meeting or a presiding or other senior judge mentoring 
the judge who engaged in inappropriate conduct.221  Allowing corrective action 
to take place either through an established Lawyers Assistance Program or other 
informal means could be the most effective means of protecting the public, as 
the authority providing the correction would presumably be one the offending 
judge trusts, and, ideally, the proceeding would not become adversarial.  As 
discussed below, striving to make the process just (from the judge’s perspective) 
and the correction restorative rather than punitive would serve to eliminate the 
harmful consequences that come with shaming the offending judge. 
An obvious challenge to the informal process is that a judge might not be 
willing to confront another judge with an allegation of misconduct or 
wrongdoing.  Furthermore, a judge might be unwilling to report his colleague to 
                                                      
 218. See Guidelines for Cases Involving Judicial Disability, 69 JUDICATURE 110, 111 (1985) 
(providing that “it may be advisable for judicial conduct organizations to encourage the creation or 
expansion of state assistance programs where assistance programs are lacking.”). 
 219. Telephone Interview with Judge David Rothman (Nov. 9, 2012) (on file with author). 
 220. For example, the California Code of Ethics provides that: “[w]henever a judge has reliable 
information that another judge has violated any provision of the Code of Judicial Ethics, the judge 
shall take appropriate corrective action, which may include reporting the violation to the 
appropriate authority.” CA. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 3D(1) (2013), available at 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ca_code_judicial_ethics.pdf.  Canon 3D defines “appropriate 
corrective action” to include “direct communication with the judge or lawyer who has committed 
the violation, other direct action . . . or a report of the violation to the presiding judge, appropriate 
authority, or other agency or body.”  Id.  The 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct does not 
provide such an expansive rule regarding informal corrective action.  See generally MODEL CODE 
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007).  Rather, ABA Model Rule 2.15 of Canon 2 requires a judge who 
has knowledge of another judge’s commission of a violation of the Code of Judicial Canon 2 
regarding conduct to “inform the appropriate authority.”  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 
2.15 (2007).  The 2011 edition of the Code defines “appropriate authority” as “the authority having 
responsibility for initiation of disciplinary process.”  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Terminology (2011). 
 221. Telephone Interview with David Rothman (Nov. 9, 2012) (on file with the author). 
2014] Shame, Angry Judges, and the Social Media Effect 619 
the presiding judge or to an assistance program.222  As one commentator notes, 
judges might not report “because of a human tendency of judges, like others, to 
‘close ranks’ to protect their own or because [of] a ‘thin black robe of silence’ 
among judges . . . .”223  Yet, this is precisely why judges should be inclined to 
confront a colleague who has displayed anger in the courtroom; arguably, judges 
feel responsible for maintaining the judiciary’s integrity and should take 
corrective action to fulfill that responsibility.224 
In addition, some state judicial conduct commissions are authorized to order 
peer counseling and mentoring as part of the formal disciplinary process.225  
Although these corrections are arguably not as effective when imposed by 
someone outside of offending judge’s community, they should be used when 
possible (as private corrections) to modify the judge’s behavior before the 
commission pursues public proceedings against the judge. 
C.  Reconciliation-Type Meetings 
As a third approach, shame can be used not to stigmatize but rather to 
“reintegrate” the judge into her community.  As aforementioned, reintegrative 
shaming attempts to use shame as a constructive force, combining strong 
disapproval of an offender’s bad conduct with respect for the person who 
committed the act and an invitation to rejoin her community.226  Unlike 
stigmatizing shame,227 this process encourages feelings of shame regarding the 
behavior but avoids stigmatizing the individual.228  Commentators define 
restorative justice “a process that brings victims and offenders together to face 
each other, to inform each other about their crimes and victimization, to learn 
                                                      
 222. See JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 1.04 (4th ed. 2007) 
(explaining that judicial conduct commissions were created in part because of the impression that 
judges could not effectively “self-regulate,” as they were too inclined to protect one another). 
 223. Greene, supra note 45, at 717–18. 
 224. One judge’s behavior reflects on the entire judiciary.  See, e.g., In re Fuller, 798 N.W.2d 
408, 420 (S.D. 2011) (emphasizing that the judge’s misbehavior “makes it more difficult for every 
judge in this state to maintain that respect for our courts and thus our ability to effectively resolve 
society’s legal disputes.”). 
 225. See supra note 212. 
 226. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 101, at 55. 
 227. See id. (describing the differences between reintegrative shaming and disintegrative 
shaming). 
 228. Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative 
Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 231 (2003).  Proponents of reintegrative shaming suggest that 
restorative justice works because of the shame that results from the wrongdoer acknowledging his 
offense.  See Michael S. King, Critique and Comment, Restorative Justice, Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence and the Rise of Emotionally Intelligent Justice, 32 MELB. U. L. REV. 1096, 1109 
(2008).  The symbolic reparation that accompanies a successful mediation conference in the 
restorative justice field requires these two necessary steps: (1) the offender clearly expresses 
genuine shame and remorse over his actions; and (2) the victim begins to forgive the offender.  See 
id.  In restorative justice, how shame is used (or not used) will often determine whether the 
conference succeeds.  See id. 
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about each others’ backgrounds, and to collectively reach agreement on a 
‘penalty’ or ‘restorative justice sanction.’”229  This Article uses the term 
“restorative corrections” to mean corrections that contain certain attributes of 
traditional restorative justice programs; it does not mean corrections as an 
alternative to incarceration for a criminal.230  Rather, the Article borrows two 
key attributes from restorative justice programs to recommend the same as 
innovations to traditional forms of judicial discipline: the focus on community 
and the use of reintegrative shaming. 
In the context of criminal law, reintegrative shaming occurs in reconciliation 
meetings where the offender, victim, and facilitator come together to discuss 
proper reparations.231  Reintegrative shaming in the context of judicial 
corrections could also involve a meeting between the offender and the offended 
party, along with a facilitator trained to encourage a productive dialogue 
between the two parties.  The offending judge would have the opportunity to 
offer an authentic apology to the offended party,232 which, if accepted, could 
resolve the matter.  Therefore, rather than the peer-to-peer meetings described 
above, this approach would include the offended person as well. 
Ideally, this restorative approach would aid in eliciting an empathic response 
from the judge, rather than an angry, hostile one.  It would also provide the 
offended party an opportunity to air his concerns to the offending judge and 
explain the impact of the judge’s behavior on the party.233  In assessing 
discipline, sanctioning tribunals occasionally acknowledge the judge’s 
contrition about her offensive behavior.234  However, unless ordered by the 
                                                      
 229. Luna, supra note 228, at 228. 
 230. This Article’s discussion of restorative justice is not meant to compare judges’ 
misbehavior to crimes, but rather to extend the concept of restorative justice to the context of 
judicial discipline. 
 231. See King, supra note 228, at 1104–05 (discussing various types of reconciliation 
meetings, including victim-offender mediations, family group conferences, and circle methods, 
which involve more participants, including supporters of both the victim and the offender as well 
as community leaders. 
 232. See Goodman, supra note 100, at 1537–38 (distinguishing between real apologies, in 
which the offender accepts responsibility for his actions, and “botched apologies,” in which the 
offender attempts to justify her behavior and fails to express remorse).  See also Stephanos Bibas 
& Richard A. Bierschbach, Essay, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure,  
114 YALE L.J. 85, 88–90 (2004) (highlighting the profound impact that remorse and apology can 
have in the criminal law context); Luna, supra note 228, at 229 (“Accountability is evidenced by 
recognizing the wrongfulness of one’s conduct, expressing remorse for any resulting injury, and 
taking steps to repair damaged social relationships.”). 
 233. See Brown & Wolf, supra note 18, at 254–55 (explaining that the restorative approach 
facilitates a broader dialogue about the offender’s conduct by including the offended party in the 
disciplinary process). 
 234. See, e.g., In re Deming, 736 P.2d 639, 659 (Wash. 1987) (en banc) (stating that in 
determining an appropriate sanction, the court considers factors such as whether the judge 
apologized for misconduct). 
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commission, the victim of the judge’s rude, offensive behavior rarely hears an 
apology.235 
Although this type of meeting between the offender and the offended could 
prove extremely beneficial as an alternative to traditional judicial discipline, the 
idea is fraught with challenges.  First, it puts the angry judge and the object of 
the judge’s wrath at the same table, on equal footing.  This runs contrary to our 
typical perception of the judge as holding a position of power in our society.236   
Additionally, it is difficult to imagine a judge having the humility to participate 
and learn from this experience. 
Furthermore, at times procedural hurdles might stand in the way of such a 
meeting.  Many disciplinary commissions lack the ability under their governing 
rules to impose innovative alternatives to discipline.  Although some 
commissions can require counseling, mentoring,237 and education as part of the 
disciplinary process, others are limited to private and public admonishments and 
suspensions.238  Commissions that do have some degree of flexibility might use 
these innovative techniques in an effort to modify the judge’s angry behavior.  
For example, the New Mexico Judicial Standards Commission is permitted to 
impose non-disciplinary dispositions, including counseling, mentoring, or other 
assistance.239  Similarly, the California Commission on Judicial Performance 
may “defer termination of a preliminary investigation for a period not to exceed 
two years for observation and review of a judge’s conduct.”240  During this 
                                                      
 235. See In re Assad, 185 P.3d 1044, 1054 (Nev. 2008) (ordering the judge to issue a formal 
apology to the aggrieved party and enroll in a judicial ethics class after he ordered that the girlfriend 
of a man who failed to pay traffic tickets be thrown into jail when the main failed to appear in 
court). 
 236. Lubet, supra note 4, at 12.  In describing the judge’s role in today’s society as a “maximum 
boss,” Lubet noted that “[w]e stand when the judge enters and leaves the room. Our ‘pleadings’ are 
‘respectfully submitted.’ Before speaking, we make sure that it ‘pleases the court.’  We obey the 
judge’s orders and we even say ‘thank you’ for adverse rulings.”  Id. 
 237. See, e.g., Pubic Reprimand and Order of Additional Education: Honorable George Henry 
Boyette Justice of the Peace, Precinct 3 College Station, Brazos County, Texas, ST. TEX. 
COMMISSION JUD. CONDUCT 3 http://wtaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/BoyettJudicial 
Conduct20111.pdf (publicly reprimanding Judge George Boyette and ordering him to obtain ten 
hours of instruction with a mentor, in addition to judicial education).  See also In re Davis,  
82 S.W.3d 140, 150–51 (Tex. Spec. Ct. Rev. 2002) (publicly reprimanding Judge Rick Davis and 
requiring him to meet with a mentor judge for eight hours). 
 238. According to the American Judicature Society, some states allow for informal dispositions 
before formal charges are filed (including mentoring and counseling), while others do not.  See 
CYNTHIA GRAY, A STUDY OF STATE JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE SANCTIONS 87–89 (2002).  For 
example, Alabama allows the commission to impose advice and further counseling as an informal 
disposition, whereas Iowa, Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Washington 
do not allow for informal dispositions.  Id. 
 239. N.M. JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMM’N, supra note 212. 
 240. CAL. COMM’N ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE R. 112 (2013), available at http://cjp.ca.gov/ 
res/docs/appendix/CJP_Rules.pdf. 
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monitoring period, the Commission could hold a reconciliation meeting.241  
These meetings could also be implemented informally, through a lawyers’ 
assistance program or the court itself, facilitated by the presiding judge. 
In addition, if the case is still pending and the judge is still presiding, a 
conversation between the judge and the offended party could not occur.  
Similarly, some judges or offended parties may not agree to this type of meeting, 
depending on their level of distrust of the system or each other.  If the judge 
displayed anger at a criminal defendant that was in some way related to the 
defendant’s crime, a judge may be unwilling to apologize for his behavior, 
feeling it was justified.242  However, if the case is closed or the judge is no longer 
presiding over the case, a reconciliation meeting can offer a valuable opportunity 
for the judge to hear from the offended party about how the judge’s anger and 
hostility affected him. 
D.  Traditional Discipline by a Conduct Commission 
With improved efforts to keep a judge’s anger from escalating to the point that 
formal disciplinary charges are filed, judicial conduct commissions should serve 
as the ultimate step, to be used only when other informal means have failed.  
Commissions already dismiss over eighty percent of judicial conduct 
complaints.243  With the remaining allegations that commissions the find 
meritorious, and to the extent allowed by their applicable governing rules,244 
commissions should streamline discipline for angry judges, offering one private 
warning (perhaps coupled with counseling or education) and, for a subsequent 
meritorious complaint, imposing discipline that will express the commission’s 
condemnation while getting the judge’s attention.245  Typically, this means a 
suspension.246 
Commissions should avoid the typical, intermediate steps, such as publicly 
reprimanding angry judges without suspension.247  By avoiding these steps, 
                                                      
 241. Alternatively, if the disciplinary tribunal lacks authority to implement a reconciliation 
meeting, judges within that jurisdiction, under the direction of the presiding judge, could undertake 
to conduct the meeting themselves. 
 242. See Maroney, supra note 2, at 1257 (arguing that a judge is entitled to express anger or 
emotion during a sentencing hearing because it “vividly demonstrates to victims and their survivors 
that they are within the judge’s zone of care.”). 
 243. GRAY, supra note 238, at 3. 
 244. See id. at 87–98 (providing a list of informal and formal sanctions available to state 
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 245. By the time a second complaint is filed against a judge, he may have already engaged in 
additional acts of anger and hostility on the bench, as indicated by the fact that complaints often 
list multiple instances of misconduct against a particular judge. 
 246. See In re Eiler, 236 P.3d 872, 882 (Wash. 2010) (en banc) (suspending a judge for five 
days after explaining that the more typical sanctions, reprimand or censure, would be too lenient 
and likely ineffective to change the judge’s behavior). 
 247. Public reprimands are commonly imposed for serious and repeated demeanor issues.  See, 
e.g., In re Schapiro, 845 So. 2d 170, 173–74 (Fla. 2003) (approving the commission’s 
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sanctioning tribunals will prevent shame from exacerbating the judge’s anger 
while still imposing discipline that serves to get the judge’s attention and thereby 
protect the public.  Furthermore, when necessary, sanctioning tribunals should 
remove angry judges from the bench.  This should occur only when informal, 
followed by formal means of discipline (as described in this Article), have failed 
to modify the judge’s behavior.  Given the likelihood of recurrence and the 
ineffectiveness of shaming discipline, sanctioning bodies should protect the 
public by removing those angry judges for whom these corrections have 
failed.248 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In this “Age of Transparency,” publicizing both the misbehavior of angry 
judges and the discipline imposed for such behavior is tempting.  The public 
loves learning about other people’s “dirty laundry,” particularly the wrongdoing 
of celebrities and judges.  And, whatever shame and humiliation result from the 
publicity seems a fitting consequence for some judges’ wrongdoing; because 
judges have a strong interest in maintaining their reputations, shame, in theory, 
should motivate judges to behave with proper decorum on the bench. 
Yet, shame impacts behavior in mysterious ways.  The consequences of 
shaming someone who is prone to anger are unpredictable at best and destructive 
at worst.  This is especially true when the shame the judge experiences as a result 
of her behavior will, in all likelihood, be magnified by social media.  The social 
media effect serves to not only publicize the judge’s wrongdoing, but also allow 
the public to react and thereby participate in the shaming. 
Accordingly, the time has come to revolutionize conceptions of judicial 
discipline, modify past assumptions, and take seriously the task of determining 
whether public sanctions serve to correct the misbehavior of angry judges.  
Watching and listening to Judge William Watkins lose his temper and scream at 
Arthur Hage in the courtroom is troubling and leaves no doubt that organizations 
involved in judicial education, support, and discipline should work to prevent 
such outbursts and modify judges’ angry behavior through corrections.  Yet, 
public discipline—discipline that shames—is unlikely to serve these purposes. 
  
                                                      
recommendation of a public reprimand for a judge who repeatedly made belittling remarks, 
including calling an attorney “stupid” in court); In re Wright, 694 So. 2d 734, 735–36 (Fla. 1997) 
(reprimanding a judge for rude and inappropriate behavior, including telling a party to “[k]eep your 
mouth shut”). 
 248. See In re Spruance, 532 P.2d 1209, 1226 (Cal. 1975) (en banc) (removing a judge from 
office and explaining that the court has a “duty to preserve the integrity and independence of the 
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